Test Fairness of an Election Agenda under Equal Ranking Counts

Voters rank candidates A,B,C. Each candidate receives the same number of first-place rankings and the same number of second-place rankings. Candidate A proposes that B and C first compete head to head, then the winner competes against A. Is this procedure necessarily fair or neutral among the candidates? ### Constraints and Clarifications Use pairwise majority voting from strict complete preferences. Clarify how ties are handled; construct a no-tie example so the conclusion does not depend on an unstated tie-break. Here fairness means that equal positional support does not justify granting one named candidate a privileged agenda position, rather than a claim about every possible voting axiom. ### What a Strong Answer Covers Build a profile satisfying the positional constraints, compute both head-to-head rounds, and distinguish positional counts from pairwise preferences and agenda effects. ### Follow-up Questions - What happens if B rather than A receives the final-round position in the same profile? - Do equal first- and second-place counts imply all pairwise contests are tied?